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Child Mortality, Commodity Price Volatility and the Resource Curse 
 
 
Abstract 
Given many developing economies depend on primary commodities, the fluctuations of 
commodity prices may imply significant effects for the wellbeing of children. To investigate, 
this paper examines the relationship between child mortality and commodity price 
movements as reflected by country-specific commodity terms-of-trade. Employing a panel of 
69 low and lower-middle income countries over the period 1970-2010, we show that 
commodity terms-of-trade volatility increases child mortality in highly commodity-dependent 
importers suggesting a type of ‘scarce’ resource curse. Strikingly however, good institutions 
appear able to mitigate the negative impact of volatility. The paper concludes by highlighting 
this tripartite relationship between child mortality, volatility and good institutions and posits 
that an effective approach to improving child wellbeing in low to lower-middle income 
countries will combine hedging, import diversification and improvement of institutional 
quality. 
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1. Introduction 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of the United Nations targeted a reduction by 
two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, in the global under-five mortality rate. The latest report 
(UN, 2015) states ‘Every day in 2015, 16,000 children under five continue to die, mostly 
from preventable causes. Child survival must remain the focus of the post-2015 development 
agenda.’ In 2015, there were a shocking 6 million deaths of under-fives worldwide, of which 
3 million occur in Sub-Saharan Africa (86 deaths per 1000 live births) and 1.8 million in 
Southern Asia (50 deaths per 1000 live births); compare these mortality rates with the 6 
deaths per 1000 live births in developed countries. The same regions appear to be 
commodity-dependent low and lower-middle income countries, see Figure 1. This suggests a 
link between commodity-dependence and child mortality, the subject of investigation in this 
paper. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Specifically, we study the impact of the growth and volatility of commodity prices on child 
mortality and, in doing so, extend previous work examining (i) the relationship between 
economic growth and natural resource endowments (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 2001) – the so-
called resource curse and (ii) the linkages between such endowments and serious health 
conditions (de Soysa and Gizelis, 2013, 2016; Sterck, 2016). Our focus on young children has 
a twofold rationale: firstly, improving child survival rates in the developing world is of the 
utmost importance as recognised by the UN and secondly, children are particularly 
vulnerable to diseases and other health risks related to either the quality of nutrition, or the 
quality of life more generally (see Galiani et al., 2005), both of which can be partially traced 
back to the global commodity market. 
Surprisingly, the relationship between commodity prices and child mortality remains 
underexplored in the extant literature, although a plethora of signs point to a potential link: 
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for example, booms in food prices are theorised to lead to malnutrition (Christian, 2010; 
Darnton-Hill and Cogill, 2010), and more broadly, commodity prices affect macroeconomic 
conditions (Céspedes and Velasco, 2014), which in turn determine infant mortality rates 
(Baird et al., 2011). The few exceptions include Miller and Urdinola (2010) who examine the 
case of Columbia using three episodes of sharp coffee price movements in 1975, 1985 and 
1989-90. More recently, Lee et al. (2015) employing a panel method over the period 2001-
2011, suggest that food price inflation impacts developing country infant mortality. However, 
in a wider context, the literature reports that both the level (or growth) and the volatility of 
macroeconomic variables can affect economic growth and other measures of welfare 
(Mendoza, 1997; Blattman et al., 2007; Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Van der Ploeg and 
Poelhekke, 2009; Bansal et al., 2014). Our paper adopts the methodological approach of this 
latter literature to investigate the determinants of infant mortality, and in particular focuses on 
the role of the global commodity market. Section 2 explains our theoretical framework in 
more depth. 
To isolate the specific effect of commodity trade, we examine for the first time the 
effect of ‘commodity terms-of-trade’ (CTOT) on child mortality in a large panel of poor 
developing countries. CTOT is a country-specific index that allows us to account for the 
effect of a number of commodities simultaneously. This index reflects an individual 
country’s position in the commodity market by measuring national commodity trade 
structures; therefore movements in global commodity prices differently affect CTOT across 
countries (Spatafora and Tytell, 2009, Ricci et al., 2013, and Cavalcanti et al., 2014). Since 
we are interested in evaluating the effect of commodity prices on child mortality, the CTOT 
index is preferred to the traditional TOT because the latter includes not only primary 
commodities but also manufactured and high value-added goods. Some recent studies reveal 
that the CTOT index exhibits a significant impact on economic growth (Spatafora and Tytell, 
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2009, and Cavalcanti et al., 2014) and the real exchange rate (Aizenman et al., 2012, and 
Ricci et al., 2013).  
We consider a sample of 69 low and middle-low income countries over the period 
1970-2010. Of these, 25 countries are net commodity exporters and 44 are net commodity 
importers. To assess the impact of the degree of commodity dependence, we compare these 
groups with two smaller sub-samples consisting of the most commodity-dependent countries. 
Panel least-squares estimations show the main driver through which commodity prices can 
affect child mortality is their volatility, not the growth rate. As an explanation for the latter, 
we show that the CTOT of developing countries exhibits either no or weak trend, an outcome 
consistent with the observations of Harvey et al. (2010) for individual long-run commodity 
prices and Blattman et al. (2007) for countries’ TOT. Subsequently, we demonstrate that the 
volatility effect operates primarily in heavily commodity-dependent importers. These 
countries tend to suffer from higher levels of commodity volatility than heavily commodity-
dependent exporters. This not only illustrates the adverse impact of high commodity 
dependence on child survival but also reveals a ‘scarce’ resource curse. In other words, the 
typical resource curse applies where countries have an abundance of a natural resource, 
whereas volatility is particularly harmful when countries have a lack of essential resources 
and are forced to import them. Importantly we show that good institutions, for example as 
proxied by political regime data, can shield importers from the detrimental effects of 
volatility.  
Given the aforementioned consequences of volatility, using financial hedging and 
reducing commodity dependence through import substitution and/or diversification of the 
commodity basket in commodity-importing nations, appears critical to decreasing child 
mortality. Improving the quality of institutions must also be a priority. The rest of the paper is 
set out as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework whilst section 3 presents the 
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methodology. Section 4 includes discussion of the data sources and sample construction 
whilst section 5 presents the empirical results and their interpretation. Finally, section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 Several channels transmit changes in global commodity prices to child mortality rates, and 
these are schematically represented in Figure 2, and discussed below. We distinguish here 
between channels that rely on the level of commodity prices (e.g. food price inflation), and 
those triggered by their volatility (representing the uncertainty of future price movements). 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
2.1. Level view 
There are major reasons to expect that a range of commodity prices are critical for child 
survival. Firstly and despite a lack of empirical work (Lee et al., 2016), booms in food prices 
are often theorised to be related to increased malnutrition and consequently considered a 
major cause of child mortality (e.g., Christian, 2010; Darnton-Hill and Cogill, 2010). This is 
included within the cost channel of Figure 2, which represents the effect of a range of global 
and domestic commodity prices, including food and energy, on the costs of running the 
household, and thus decisions with regard to food consumption and healthcare. This 
argument is consonant with the micro-model by Strulik (2004) who explains the expenditure-
mortality nexus at a household level by separating “controllable” factors of infant mortality 
(e.g, household expenditure on nutrition and healthcare) from those beyond a family’s control 
(e.g. state-funded healthcare support).  
Secondly, given many developing countries specialize in trading primary 
commodities, their economies are vulnerable to movements in the global commodity price 
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level (Céspedes and Velasco, 2014). This would affect the country’s GDP, and subsequently 
government income, and the general quality of public health-related services provided in the 
country, which would, in turn, affect child mortality rates. This is depicted the government 
channel in Figure 2 and corresponds to the “uncontrollable” (by the household) mortality rate 
in Strulik’s (2004) model.  
Thirdly, one can argue that in commodity-dependent countries much household 
income would depend on global commodity prices, via its effect on employment in the 
relevant sectors (e.g., see Miller and Urdinola, 2010). A change in the level of commodity 
prices can thus be transmitted to child mortality rates through the income channel in Figure 2. 
For example, a steep fall in the price of coffee may see declining employment in the 
agricultural sector, loss of household income, reduced calorie intake by a household’s 
children and increased child mortality. Again, this view supports the hypothesis that a range 
of commodity prices, and not solely food, affect child mortality rates in commodity-
dependent countries, entering the household decision-problem either as a disposable income 
component, or as expenditures.  
 
2.2. Volatility view 
The above discussion reflects the plausible level effects of commodity prices on child 
survival. However, the volatility of such prices may also have significant effects; after all 
commodity prices are acknowledged to be particularly volatile, increasing the risks around 
prospective revenues and costs (see Harvey et al., in press). Additional macroeconomic 
uncertainty can delay or limit capital investment by commodity producers and healthcare 
investment by their related governments, ultimately reducing future growth and increasing 
poverty (see, inter alia, Blattman et al., 2007 and Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2009). We 
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refer to the effect on private investment as the investment channel in Figure 2 and allow 
effect of uncertainty on government investment to be mediated via the government channel.  
Of course, the uncertainty resulting from commodity price volatility is also likely to 
change the behaviour of households. For example, they may attempt to partially offset future 
changes in household income or expenditures by creating reserves (i.e., savings), or by cross-
subsidizing between households (e.g., arrangements for informal group childcare to free up 
mothers’ time for work; see, Blau and Robins, 1988 and Doiron and Kalb, 2005). However, 
these precautionary arrangements (illustrated by the precautionary channel in Figure 2) 
divert funds from being spent on health and good quality food. Besides, frequent, persistent 
and/or large commodity prices shocks may overwhelm household reserves and prevent 
efficient cross-subsidization, which cannot always be quickly arranged.  
 
2.3 Net exporters versus net importers  
It is important to see how the five channels above (cost, government, income, investment and 
precautionary) operate for net commodity exporters and importers. For net exporting 
countries, a significant portion of GDP is directly commodity-derived (Sinnott, 2009, 
Medina, 2010, and Murphy et al., 2010), implying falls in prices may raise child mortality via 
the government channel and the income channel (vice versa for price increases). On the other 
hand, for large net importers of commodities like energy and food, falls in such prices may 
lessen child mortality via the same channels, as well as the cost channel. Therefore, from the 
perspective of the level of commodity prices, their movements would have different 
directional effects on the child mortality in net exporters and importers. 
By contrast, an increase in volatility will have similarly detrimental effects on child 
mortality for both net importers and exporters. For example, with higher volatility of energy, 
exporters will be less sure of their future revenues, and this would reduce investments, while 
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importers would be less sure of future costs, with the same effect on investment. Although 
the directional effect on child mortality via the investment and the precautionary channels 
will be the same, the magnitude will depend on individual country circumstances. 
 
2.4. Role of institutions 
An important country consideration are its institutions. Given the “uncontrollable” mortality 
rate is a function of country healthcare provision, institutional quality (e.g., the quality of 
those government institutions with responsibility for decisions regarding healthcare) will 
determine the system’s effectiveness in mitigating any negative effects of commodity price 
movements. Indeed, studies such as Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) and Van der Ploeg (2011) 
already suggest that good institutions play an essential role in economies deriving positive 
benefits from resource income. Measures of institutional quality include direct measures of 
corruption or type of political regime, such as whether a specific regime is considered a 
democracy or autocracy. This is because first, corrupt institutions foster rent-seeking and 
unproductive ‘white elephant’ investments (Chowdhury, 2004, Dietz et al., 2007 and Van der 
Ploeg, 2011) and are often associated with autocracies; and second, autocracies tend to resist 
modernisation policies such as industrialisation (Acemoglu et al., 2001, Dietz et al., 2007, 
and Cuberes and Jerzmanowski, 2009), which reduce commodity dependence and lessen its 
adverse consequences for economic performance and child survival. 
 
2.5. Hypotheses 
From our theoretical framework we can formulate four main hypotheses. First, a range of 
commodity prices, and not solely food, affect child mortality rates in commodity-dependent 
countries. Second, level changes in commodity prices can have different directional effects 
on net exporters and importers. Third, commodity price volatility raises the rate of infant 
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mortality unambiguously across net exporters and importers, although the magnitude of the 
effect will depend on country circumstances. Fourth, better institutions reduce the adverse 
effect of commodity price volatility on child mortality. 
 
3. Methodology  
To assess the relationship between economic conditions and the child mortality rate, the 
literature (see, inter alia, Pritchett and Summers, 1996; Ruhm, 2000; Gerdtham and Ruhm, 
2006; and Gonzalez and Quast, 2011) has estimated the following equation: 
 𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + η𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (1) 
where 𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of mortality rate on the ith cross-sectional unit at time t,  𝐸𝑖𝑡 
represents the macroeconomy, proxied by either the unemployment rate or GDP per capita, 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of control variables, 𝛿𝑡 is a time-specific effect which represents child mortality 
determinants that vary uniformly across countries over time (for example, medical 
technologies) and η
𝑖
 is a country-specific effect which captures the factors that differ across 
countries but are time-invariant (such as climate or culture).  Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term.   
There are some key econometric issues raised by past empirical studies regarding the 
estimation of child mortality determinants in (1). The first issue is the incidental association 
caused by excluded variables that affect both the mortality rate and economic activity. 
Dealing with the effect of excluded variables that are constant over time is possible by 
estimating either fixed-effects (with country-specific effects) or first-differenced models (see 
Pritchett and Summers, 1996 and Ross, 2006).  
The second issue relates to the downward trend of the child mortality rate over time due 
to global factors such as health improvements. More specifically, recent medical discoveries 
and the spread of low-cost health interventions address health problems and lessen child 
mortality. The empirical neglect of these improvements can generate misleading results since 
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any reduction of child mortality could wrongly be attributed to other variables such as GDP 
growth or democracy (Ross, 2006). Including the time-specific effect in estimated models 
captures any universal trend.  
A third issue notes that equation (1) requires considerable independent variation of 
explanatory variables over time. Other panel studies that have considered this requirement 
include Ruhm (2000) and Gonzalez and Quast (2011) using data from states from within one 
country or Gerdtham and Ruhm (2006), examining data from OECD countries that might be 
considered integrated. Our data appears to satisfy the condition as CTOT fluctuations suggest 
enough independent variation across countries in our sample (e.g., the estimated correlation 
coefficients between our measures of CTOT were generally low - see section 4.2). Notably, 
trade structures differ significantly across countries and these structures determine CTOT 
responses to global commodity price changes. Additionally, although we also decompose the 
sample into exporters and importers, these sub-groups are still heterogeneous as the 
export/import composition varies across countries. 
The final econometric issue refers to the inability of annual observations to 
appropriately capture the medium and long-term effects of explanatory variables on a 
dependent variable (Blattman et al., 2007 and Cavalcanti et al., 2014). Thus, and as is 
common in the economic growth literature, we transform the annual series into non-
overlapping five-year averages with a maximum of eight observations per country. The five-
year averages (i) allow us to define volatility as the standard deviation of CTOT growth 
within each five-year window (ii) are typically considered reasonable to smooth out business 
cycle fluctuations and (iii) are also useful given the persistence of commodity price shocks is 
rather high (see Harvey et al., 2010; indeed, Modified Dickey-Fuller unit root tests on our 
annual log level CTOT data show that the overwhelming majority of countries cannot reject 
the null of a unit root – see section 4.2).  
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Taking into account the above issues and any non-stationary behaviour (see section 4.1 
and 4.2 for unit root tests), we estimate the following first-difference model instead of (1):  
 ∆𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∆𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑣𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽3 ∆𝑋𝑖𝑠 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠    (2) 
where the subscript ‘s’ represents one of the five-year averages, s = 1, 2,… S, with S = T/5, 
and T denoting the years between 1970 and 2010. ∆𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑠 is therefore the first-difference of 
the logarithm of under-five mortality rate in the ith country in the sth observation and 
∆𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑠 and 𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑣𝑖𝑠 refer to CTOT growth and CTOT volatility respectively. ∆𝑋𝑖𝑠  is a set 
of control variables (all in first-differences of the logarithm) including: the gross primary 
school enrolment ratio to control for the tendency of education to reduce mortality, the share 
of the population aged 0–4 and share of the population aged 65 and older to control for the 
age of the population, democracy dummies and domestic credit to private sector relative to 
GDP to control for institutional quality and financial development respectively, and GDP per 
capita growth to control for economic conditions (see Pritchett and Summers, 1996, Ruhm, 
2000 and Gonzalez and Quast, 2011). Finally, the 𝛿𝑠 term is a time-specific effect and 𝜀𝑖𝑠 is 
the error term.  
Work examining infant mortality like Pritchett and Summers (1996) also employ first-
differences; this is typically part of a strategy to mitigate artificiality in child mortality data. 
The use of a growth-type model also allows more ready comparisons with the recent 
economic growth literature  (see, for example, Easterly, 1999, and Younger, 2001). We also 
adopt the approach of Pritchett and Summers (1996) by estimating the model with and 
without GDP per capita growth. GDP per capita growth is one of the possible factors through 
which commodity price volatility can affect child mortality. Both models lead to qualitatively 
the same results and thus only results that include GDP per capita growth are shown. Finally 
note that following others (see Arezki and Brückner, 2012, Cuberes and Jerzmanowski, 2009 
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and Iyigun and Owen, 2004), we estimate (2) with panel least squares and cluster-robust 
standard errors at the country level to control for autocorrelation and/or heteroskedasticity.  
To extend the analysis to investigate whether the effect of CTOT growth on the first-
difference of mortality rate is conditional on the degree of commodity dependence, we also 
estimate (2) over a sub-sample that includes the most commodity-dependent countries in our 
dataset. Finally, to see whether institutional quality plays a role, we estimate the following 
model: 
 ∆𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∆𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽2 (𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑣 × 𝐼𝑄𝐻)𝑖𝑠 
 +𝛽3 (𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑣 × 𝐼𝑄𝐿) 𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽4 ∆𝑋𝑖𝑠 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠    (3) 
where (𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑣 × 𝐼𝑄𝐻)𝑖𝑠 and (𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑣 × 𝐼𝑄𝐿)𝑖𝑠 are the interactions between CTOT volatility 
and proxies for high (𝐼𝑄𝐻) and low (𝐼𝑄𝐿) institutional quality. To briefly summarise the 
overall empirical strategy, regression (2) is estimated for the entire sample and the results 
compared with those of the highly commodity-dependent sample, whilst regression (3) is 
estimated for highly commodity-dependent sample only. Appropriate robustness checks are 
also carried out in section 5.  
 
4. Data 
4.1  Child mortality  
An annual series of the under-five mortality rate, over the 1970–2010 period, is obtained 
from the UN Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (IGME, includes the United 
Nations Children's Fund, the World Health Organization, the World Bank and the United 
Nations Population Division). This series measures the probability per 1,000 that a new-born 
baby will die before reaching the age of five. The data is constructed from such sources as 
vital registration (VR) systems, sample vital registration (SVR) systems, surveys and 
censuses, and is available for almost all countries over a long period. It thus serves our goals 
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better than the survey datasets employed by some child mortality studies such as Ruhm 
(2000), Miller and Urdinola (2010) and Kudamatsu (2012), which have limited country 
coverage, particularly for developing nations. Additionally, surveys often present 
discrepancies (Pritchett and Summers, 1996) and national survey data, especially for 
authoritarian nations, is subject to falsification by the reporting of lower than actual child 
mortality rates (Ross, 2006). Pritchett and Summers (1996) employ an earlier version of the 
IGME dataset, although they recognise that the interpolation and extrapolation techniques 
used in construction can potentially make some of the variation over time in reported series 
artificial. Recently these techniques have been improved to represent, with more flexibility, 
the changes in child mortality over time (see Alkema and New, 2014). In any case, the data is 
constructed using a variety of sources which helps limit the effect of any falsified reports. 
During the later results section, we control for the common determinants of child mortality 
and show their effects are consistent with the extant literature, suggesting that our findings 
are not biased by using the IGME dataset. 
 To examine the order of integration of the logarithm of our mortality rate (𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡) and 
its first difference (∆𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡), we carry out Fisher-type and IPS panel unit root tests with and 
without trend. Table A1 in the online Appendix [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE FILE A] 
shows the logarithm of our mortality rate is I(1) at the 5% level of significance whilst its first 
difference is I(0). For other evidence of non-stationary mortality rates see Caporale and Gil-
Alana (2015). 
 
4.2  Commodity terms-of-trade 
The commodity terms-of-trade (CTOT) index, outlined in Spatafora and Tytell (2009), 
comprises 32 commodities and has been recently used by Cavalcanti et al. (2014). We 
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employ an extended version, constructed by Nikola Spatafora (n.d) and based on 46 annual 
commodity prices from 1970. It is defined as follows: 
 𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 = ∏ (
𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑈𝑉𝑡
)
𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑗 / ∏ (
𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑈𝑉𝑡
)
𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑗   (4) 
where 𝑃𝑗𝑡 is the price of commodity j in year t, MUVt is the manufacturing unit value index in 
year t used as a deflator, and Xij (Mij) is the share of exports (imports)  of commodity j in 
country i’s GDP. Spatafora’s weights are time-averaged over the period 1988-2010 and 
therefore changes in CTOT occur solely in response to commodity price fluctuations. For 
clarification, taking the logarithm of (4) gives:  
 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 = ∑ (𝑋𝑖𝑗 − 𝑀𝑖𝑗) ln(𝑃𝑗𝑡 𝑀𝑈𝑉𝑡⁄ )
 
𝑗  (5) 
The above equation (5) shows that CTOT reflects the country-specific dimension of global 
commodity prices since the composition of a country’s net export (𝑋𝑖𝑗 − 𝑀𝑖𝑗) determines the 
response of national CTOT to changes in relative prices (𝑃𝑗𝑡 𝑀𝑈𝑉𝑡⁄ ). CTOT growth is the 
first difference of CTOT (in logs) and CTOT volatility is the five-year standard deviation of 
CTOT growth (for similar approach, see, for instance, Mendoza, 1997; Blattman et al., 2007; 
and Cavalcanti et al., 2014). 
The export and import shares of individual commodities used to construct the CTOT 
index are taken from the United Nations’ COMTRADE database whilst the source of 
commodity prices is the IMF Commodity Price System database. The MUV data are obtained 
from UNCTAD’s Handbook of Statistics database and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
database.  
To examine both the persistence of commodity price shocks and the order of integration 
issues, we apply the Modified Dickey–Fuller unit root test to annual data of the log level of 
CTOT for all individual countries (using constant with trend models and using AIC to 
determine the appropriate lag length).  The results in Table A2 of the online Appendix 
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[INSERT LINK TO ONLINE FILE A] show that the vast majority of countries (i.e., 63 
countries out of 69 at the 5% level of significance) cannot reject the null of a unit root. This is 
strong evidence that commodity price shocks present high persistence. Please note that the 
results without trend provide analogous findings. In the same table, the Modified Dickey–
Fuller unit root test without trend for the first difference of log CTOT (i.e., growth) shows 
I(0) series for 66 out of 69 countries.  Moreover, the test with trend suggests CTOT growth is 
I(0) for all countries.  Using pairwise correlation coefficients we also confirm that CTOT 
growth exhibits considerable independence of across countries (see Table A3 of the online 
Appendix [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE FILE A]).  
 
4.3  Institutional quality, democracy and other variables 
As proxies for institutional quality we use (a) data on whether a country is a democracy or 
autocracy and (b) a distribution of resources index. The source of annual democracy data is 
Cheibub et al. (2010). Democracy is a dummy variable coded 1 for a democratic political 
regime that matches all the following conditions: the effective executive and legislature are 
elected (either directly or indirectly), the existence of parties outside the governing party, 
the existence of multiple parties within the legislature, the alternation rule is not violated, 
and the incumbents (person, party, military hierarchy) do not unconstitutionally close the 
lower house of the national legislature and rewrite the rules in their favour (for more details 
see Cheibub et al., 2010).  
The distribution of resources index measures the extent to which resources such as 
healthcare, education, water and housing are distributed in society and is constructed by the 
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute at the University of Gothenburg (see Sigman and 
Lindberg, 2015, and Lindberg et al., 2014). The index itself exists in a range between 0 and 1 
where values close to 1 represent an equal distribution and 0, an entirely unequal distribution 
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of resources. Sigman and Lindberg (2015) suggest that a more equal distribution of resources 
helps underpin “egalitarian” democracy by allowing more individuals to participate 
effectively in the political arena.  
The source of our measures of financial development (i.e., domestic credit to private 
sector relative to GDP) and gross primary education enrolment ratio (a percentage of the 
population of official primary education age) is the World Bank’s Development Indicators 
dataset. The GDP per capita source is Heston et al. (2012) (see Penn World Table Version 
7.1). Finally, the demographic characteristics data (i.e., percentage of population under 5 and 
percentage of population over 65) are obtained from the UN Population Division.  
Overall, we collect data for 69 countries classified by World Bank as low- and lower-
middle-income economies. In total, there are 84 countries allocated to these classifications by 
the World Bank, however not all countries could be included in our dataset due to availability 
limitations. We focus on low- to lower-middle-income countries because many of their 
children consume at or below the subsistence level, making them more vulnerable to 
commodity price fluctuations. Additionally, focusing on countries with reasonably 
homogenous economic outcomes allows us to avoid certain selection bias issues. For 
example, Ross (2006) attributes the positive effect of democracy on the reduction of child 
mortality, reported by studies such as Zweifel and Navia )2000(, Lake and Baum )2001( and 
Boix (2003) to the sample omission of autocracies with good economic and social 
achievements whilst including democracies with similarly records. The imposed homogeneity 
of poor economic outcomes in our study mitigates this particular selection bias.   
We decompose the countries selected into commodity exporters and importers, unlike 
Cavalcanti et al. (2014) who decompose countries into exporters and other countries, in order 
to investigate commodity export dependence.  If we crudely classify exporters (importers) as 
countries with positive (negative) net commodity exports to GDP, our full sample of 69 
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countries can be separated into two samples of 25 exporters and 44 importers (see section 
A.4. in the online Appendix [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE FILE A] for a list of countries). Of 
course, such a demarcation rule doesn’t tell us about the magnitude of commodity 
dependence. The World Economic Outlook (2012) defines commodity exporters as countries 
with a share of net commodity exports to total goods exports exceeding 10 percent. Taking 
into account that the CTOT index does not include all commodities and that GDP is used as 
the denominator, we surmise that in our case a 7 percent threshold seems appropriate and 
leads to a reasonable number of countries in the highly commodity dependent sub-samples. 
Specifically, commodity exporters (importers) are defined as countries with the ratio of net 
commodity exports to GDP that exceeds 7 (-7) percent, resulting in highly commodity-
dependent subsamples containing 16 exporter and 19 importer countries. In the following 
results section, we compare the results of these latter sub-samples with those of the full 
sample demarcation to highlight the effects of commodity dependence. 
 
 
5. Empirical results  
5.1 Investigating the child mortality and CTOT relationship 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of our variables for commodity exporters and importers 
in both the full and highly commodity-dependent samples.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Given we have selected low- to lower-middle-income countries, it is unsurprising that 
annual GDP per capita is low for both exporters and importers, across the full and highly 
commodity-dependent samples. Moreover, there is a reasonable similarity in summary 
statistics across the samples, confirming the approximate homogeneity of selected countries. 
On the other hand, CTOT appears more volatile for importers than exporters (the standard 
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deviation of CTOT level for heavily commodity-dependent exporters is 76.41, whereas for 
importers it is 85.67. Carrying out an F-test of their equality results in a p-value of 0.001). 
This suggests that commodity price movements within our sample present the potential to be 
more harmful for importers than exporters. We shall return to this later.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2, columns 1 and 2, presents the results of estimating (2) for our full sample. 
Firstly, results indicate that the effect of CTOT growth on the first-difference of infant 
mortality rates is statistically insignificant for both exporters and importers. This extends the 
findings of Turnovsky and Chattopadhyay (2003) and Blattman et al. (2007) who show that 
TOT growth is also insignificant for investment and GDP growth, respectively. Blattman et 
al. rationalise their result by suggesting that TOT exhibit weak trend. To investigate the trend 
of CTOT for both exporters and importers, we pre-test using panel unit-root tests and then 
estimate the appropriate trend function (see section A.5, tables A5 and A6, in the online 
Appendix [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE FILE A], for methodology and results). The findings 
provide evidence of no trend for commodity exporters and a small, negative trend for 
commodity importers. This suggests the argument of Blattman et al. (2007) holds in a CTOT 
context: the relatively small magnitude of CTOT over our sample period providing an 
explanation of the insignificant effect of CTOT growth on child mortality.  
Turning to the other moment of CTOT in Table 2, columns 1 and 2, the effect of CTOT 
volatility is also statistically insignificant. It would appear that at this level of stratification, 
where we haven’t separated out heavily commodity-dependent countries, volatility cannot yet 
be shown to affect mortality. However, the coefficients of the control variables are typically 
consistent with the empirical and theoretical literature, confirming the validity of IGME’s 
child mortality data. For example, GDP per capita growth significantly decreases child 
mortality across all categories, supporting previous studies (Pritchett and Summers, 1996, 
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Cutler et al., 2002, Bhalotra, 2010, and Baird et al., 2011) that demonstrate the role of 
income in reducing child mortality in poor countries. Strikingly, the significant and mortality-
reducing effect of democracy illustrates the role that institutional quality may play in welfare, 
particularly in low- to lower-middle-income countries. As noted previously, democracies are 
theorised to produce superior welfare outcomes to autocracies by producing more public 
goods and progressive income distributions (Zweifel and Navia, 2000, Lake and Baum 2001, 
Boix, 2003, and Kudamatsu, 2012). This result is in stark contrast to influential work such as 
Ross (2006) who suggests democracy does not matter for child mortality. Similarly to Ross 
(2006) our study employs country-level data, however, the finding that democracy reduces 
child mortality also draws support from the micro evidence of Kudamatsu (2012). His paper 
compares the survival of babies from the same mother, pre- and post- the arrival of 
democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, suggesting that democratisation improves wellbeing via 
changed public health policies. The difference in our study is the explicit focus on low to 
low-middle income countries where it would appear that political regime becomes an 
important determinant. Finally, other control variables such as education and development 
characteristics also tend to present the expected signs. For instance, education and financial 
development are negatively signed even when they are not significant. 
To explore the relationship between child mortality and CTOT in more depth, Table 2, 
columns 3 and 4, presents the results of estimating (2) for our heavily commodity-dependent 
samples where only exporters (importers) countries with the ratio of net commodity exports 
to GDP that exceeds 7 (-7) percent are included. As suggested in the second hypothesis, 
columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 show that the signs of the coefficients attached to CTOT growth 
are different for commodity-dependent net importers and exporters; however, given the 
statistical insignificance, within our estimation framework these are not important effects. A 
striking difference is that CTOT volatility is now strongly significant at the 1 percent level 
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for importers, lending support to our third hypothesis outlined in Section 2. Specifically, the 
positive coefficient here suggests increases in commodity terms-of-trade volatility lead to 
increases in country child mortality. Why might the significance of this result not carry over 
to exporter countries in our sample?  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 3 provides a possible explanation, graphically illustrating that CTOT level and CTOT 
growth are more volatile for commodity importers than exporters as also earlier reported in 
the summary statistics of Table 1. Additionally, an F-test for the equality of the standard 
deviations of CTOT growth for heavy exporters and importers gives a p-value of 0.002, 
rejecting equivalence. It is this higher instability of importers’ CTOT in our sample that 
makes their children more vulnerable to the identified harmful effect of commodity price 
volatility. These findings extend our understanding of the adverse outcomes of volatility and 
reinforce work by Blattman et al. (2007) and Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) suggesting 
that any adverse effect is stronger in commodity-dependent, highly volatile countries. 
We found in earlier results that as a control variable, democracy plays an important role 
in reducing child mortality in low to lower-middle income countries. Might a deeper, 
tripartite relationship exist between child mortality, volatility and a proxy for institutional 
quality, political regime? To investigate, we estimate (3) for our highly commodity-
dependent subsamples, explicitly modelling the interactions between democracy (i.e., 𝐼𝑄𝐻) 
and CTOT volatility, and autocracy (i.e., 𝐼𝑄𝐿) and CTOT volatility. Another approach would 
be to analyze separate samples of autocratic and democratic countries. Results produced are 
qualitatively similar to those using the interaction methodology. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 3, columns 1 and 2, shows that the interaction variable (i.e., CTOT volatility × political 
regime) is only significant for autocracies. This may indicate that the higher institutional 
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quality as proxied by democratic governance, lowers infant mortality in commodity-
dependent countries by mitigating the adverse effect of volatility. Notably though, the 
magnitudes of the coefficients for autocracy and democracy interaction variables (i.e., 
5.887** and 6.901 respectively) are not dissimilar and a test for equality cannot be rejected 
(i.e., p-value of 0.482). This suggests further investigation is required to ascertain the role of 
institutional quality. 
 Other measures of institutional quality may be more appropriate. In particular, the 
estimations above employ the democracy data from Cheibub et al. (2010), where we have 
transformed the annual frequency into five-year period averages by selecting the modal value 
for each of those five-year periods. A more suitable approach might be to employ the modal 
value for whole sample period. This helps us address the issue raised in the literature (see 
inter alia, Roland, 2004) that institutions may change at a slower rate than political regimes.  
Table 3, columns 3 and 4, re-estimates (3) for our highly commodity-dependent 
subsamples but now the political regime for each country is indicated by a single modal value 
for the whole sample period. Again, the interaction variable (i.e., CTOT volatility × political 
regime) is only significant for autocracies. However, this time the magnitudes of the 
coefficients for autocracy and democracy interaction variables (i.e., 7.145*** and -2.386 
respectively) are of different sign and a test for equality can be clearly rejected (i.e., p-value 
of 0.011). This offers evidence that high institutional quality inhibits the negative effects of 
commodity price fluctuations on infant mortality, as posited in our fourth hypothesis from 
Section 2. 
 
5.2  Decomposing volatility  
To shed light on possible channels by which volatility impacts infant mortality, we 
decompose countries’ CTOT into energy and non-energy CTOT. Note that the non-energy 
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basket for heavily commodity-dependent importers mainly consists of food commodities (see 
Figure 4) whilst heavily commodity-dependent exporters are relatively better diversified. We 
examine this dichotomy because (i) previous work suggests a linkage between food prices 
and child mortality, (ii) data availability (see Section 4.2) dictates the split between energy 
and non-energy commodities, and (iii) although underexplored, a prima facie case could be 
made that energy price movements are likely to be crucial to welfare measures such as child 
mortality (in particular, one might consider the growing influence of the energy-food nexus.) 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating (2) for our heavily commodity-dependent samples, 
where we employ the growth and volatility of both energy and non-energy CTOT as 
explanatory variables. Energy volatility is significant and positively signed for importers 
only, whereas CTOT non-energy volatility is insignificant, supporting our first hypothesis 
from Section 2. Note that the sign and significance of our control variables remains similar 
when comparing Table 4 with columns 3 and 4 in Table 2. Overall, this is suggestive that 
energy commodities dominate the volatility effect caused by CTOT. In other words, it would 
therefore appear as if movements in global food commodity prices are subordinate to those of 
energy when considering the impact on child mortality.  
 
5.3. Robustness  
5.3.1. Top quartile of countries ranked by magnitude of CTOT volatility 
In the above analysis we have distinguished between exporters, importers and commodity 
dependence when examining the effect of CTOT volatility. However, it follows that if the 
volatility channel is important, it will show clearly in samples that contain countries that 
present the largest volatility. Therefore, in a robustness check for the mortality-volatility 
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relationship, we estimate (2) for a sample that contains the top quartile of countries when they 
are ranked by the magnitude of CTOT volatility.     
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 shows the relevant results and again demonstrates the significance of CTOT 
volatility. Overall then, our analysis suggests that fluctuations in commodity terms-of-trade 
are an important determinant for child mortality in low- to lower-middle-income countries. 
Specifically, greater volatility ceteris paribus leads to an increase in the infant mortality rate 
and this occurs particularly where volatility is already relatively large. Policy advice would 
include improving the quality of institutions and diversifying the trade portfolio to smooth the 
time series of net exports.  
 
5.3.2. Using different thresholds 
Until now we have defined heavily commodity-dependent exporters (importers) as countries 
with the ratio of net commodity exports to GDP that exceeds 7 (-7) percent, resulting in 
subsamples containing 16 exporter and 19 importer countries. The threshold is chosen so we 
can examine heavily commodity-dependent countries but still have a sufficient number of 
countries to allow for appropriate econometric testing. If we choose a much lower threshold 
(e.g., 3% and -3%) one might expect a priori that the t-statistic of importer CTOT volatility in 
regression (2) to indicate insignificance. This is because we are now including more countries 
that are less commodity-dependent and therefore less likely to be sensitive to commodity 
price movements.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
We re-estimate (2) for 3% and -3% and indeed, this is what is found (see Table 6). However, 
when we estimate regression (2) for other high thresholds (i.e., 6% and -6%, 8% and -8%) the 
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t-statistics of importer CTOT volatility become significant at conventional levels (also see 
Table 6). 
 
5.3.3. Using another measure of institutional quality 
Estimating regression (3) for our heavily commodity-dependent subsamples and using the 
democracy data from Cheibub et al. (2010) as a proxy for institutional quality, Table 3, 
columns 3 and 4, revealed previously that the interaction variable (i.e., CTOT volatility × 
political regime) is only significant for autocracies. In this section, we now use the 
distribution of resources index constructed by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute 
at the University of Gothenburg (see section 4.3) as another proxy for institutional quality. 
Table 3, columns 5 and 6, shows the estimation of (3) with this proxy. Here we operationalize 
the index by calculating its average value for each five-year period and then generating a 
dummy equal  to 1 if the average is in top Quartile (i.e., a fair distribution of resources) and 0 
otherwise (i.e., a poor distribution of resources). Interestingly, in Table 3, the results in 
columns 5 and 6, are analogous to those in columns 3 and 4. The interaction variable (i.e., 
CTOT volatility × distribution of resources) is only significant for the poor distribution of 
resources. Indeed, the magnitude of the coefficients for poor and fair distribution interaction 
variables (i.e., 8.134*** and -4.653 respectively) are of different sign and a test for equality 
can be clearly rejected (i.e., p-value of 0.006). This provides further evidence that good 
institutional quality mitigates the adverse effects of commodity price movements on infant 
mortality rates. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study sheds a new light on the relationship between child mortality and commodity 
prices by investigating theoretically and empirically the political and economic aspects that 
 25 
may influence any association. Our theoretical framework posits four hypotheses: (1) food 
prices are not the only commodity price that affects child mortality rates in commodity-
dependent countries; (2) level changes in commodity prices can have different directional 
effects on net exporters and importers, (3) commodity price volatility adversely affects the 
rate of infant mortality; (4) better institutions limit this effect.  
Employing a sample of 69 low and lower-middle income countries over the period of 
1970-2010, we find that the volatility of the country-specific commodity terms-of-trade index 
(CTOT) links global commodity prices with child mortality in commodity-dependent 
countries, in line with our third hypothesis. These volatility effects dominate the level effects 
posited in our second hypothesis. The resource curse literature traditionally focuses on 
commodity-dependent exporters, but the curse in our paper affects mainly highly commodity-
dependent importers, thus giving a resource-scarcity aspect to the curse. The differential 
effects on exporters and importers appear to be largely due to the higher CTOT volatility of 
importers and their sensitivity to energy price volatility, consistent with our first hypothesis. 
In turn, this is related to the better diversification of exporters and consequently, a relative 
lack of sensitivity to volatile energy prices.  
From a policy perspective, our findings highlight the importance of reducing 
commodity terms-of-trade volatility, especially for commodity-importing nations. To 
circumvent the harmful effect of commodity price volatility on child mortality, financial 
hedging of energy imports can clearly play an important role. For example, the Reserve Bank 
of India recently suggested the country hedges its oil imports (Reuters, 2014). Although 
requiring longer-term planning, reducing commodity-dependence by shifting toward import 
substitution and/or increasing domestic energy production, and developing manufacturing 
and services sectors should also help avoid the curse we discuss in this paper.  
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Improving the quality of institutions is another option for domestic policymakers. Our 
model proxies institutional quality by using data on democracy and fair distribution of 
resources; results reveal better institutions lower child mortality by explicitly moderating the 
adverse effect of CTOT volatility, as posited by the fourth hypothesis. Strikingly, there 
appears to be a tripartite relationship between child mortality, volatility and good institutions 
in commodity-dependent countries. A strategic combination of hedging, diversification and 
improvement of institutional quality appears likely to be the most effective approach to 
improving child wellbeing in low- to lower-middle-income countries. 
There are several avenues for future work. For example, the CTOT measure used in this 
paper relies on time-averaged export and import weights and therefore reflects movements in 
commodity prices only. However, the child mortality effects of variations in CTOT due to 
changes in the share of exports and imports might also be significant; analysing those would 
require the construction of a new variable. Moreover, data quality and availability meant a 
maximum sample of 69 low and middle-income countries could be used in this paper. Recent 
improvements in data quality are likely to lead to larger samples in the future.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
 Summary statistics 
 Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. 
 Full sample 
 Commodity exporters Commodity importers 
Mortality under 5 992 129.496 68.519 1703 123.707 74.515 
CTOT level 1000 129.074 70.144 1760 154.020 80.610 
GDP per capita 960 1710.26 977.023 1601 1819.40 1444.574 
Financial development 831 18.876 14.438 1384 19.241 12.088 
Primary education 
enrolment  
858 85.064 27.931 1435 82.444 30.123 
Population over age 65 1000 3.420 0.784 1760 4.014 2.277 
Population under age 5 1000 16.629 2.549 1760 15.807 3.598 
 Heavily-dependent 
 Commodity exporters Commodity importers 
Mortality under 5 632 133.564 72.165 708 110.106 75.935 
CTOT  level 640 123.556 76.411 760 148.597 85.671 
GDP per capita 600 1977.31 889.986 623 1899.60 1367.860 
Financial development 537 18.642 12.012 503 19.371 13.994 
Primary education 
enrolment  
550 85.286 27.492 552 80.678 31.318 
Population over age 65 640 3.386 0.649 760 4.669 3.170 
Population under age 5 640 16.643 2.295 760 14.849 4.298 
 
Notes: Heavily commodity-dependent countries have a ratio of net commodity exports to 
GDP that exceeds 7 (-7) percent.   
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Table 2 
Child mortality, CTOT growth and volatility, 1970-2010. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Full sample  Commodity-dependent 
 Commodity 
exporters 
Cluster SE 
Commodity 
importers 
Cluster SE 
 Commodity 
exporters 
Cluster SE 
Commodity 
importers 
Cluster SE 
CTOT growth -0.151 -0.517  -0.955 0.956 
 (2.021) (2.026)  (2.557) (3.382) 
CTOT volatility  -0.0323 0.411  0.487 6.006*** 
 (1.949) (1.567)  (1.884) (1.966) 
Democracy dummy -0.870* -1.046**  -0.750 -0.988 
 (0.463) (0.417)  (0.566) (0.726) 
GDP per capita growth  -24.84*** -20.23***  -20.72*** -13.43** 
 (4.095) (5.002)  (4.939) (5.985) 
Δ(Primary education -9.906*** -0.984  -14.62** 6.905 
enrolment ratio) (3.513) (3.407)  (5.365) (4.493) 
Δ(Financial development)  -2.075* -0.865  -3.624*** -3.830** 
 (1.180) (1.170)  (1.144) (1.685) 
Δ(Population over age 65)  14.11 -24.31*  16.78 -19.34 
 (16.25) (12.11)  (17.87) (17.83) 
Δ(Population under age 5) 43.76*** -21.70*  52.24*** -1.392 
 (10.40) (12.05)  (16.09) (11.24) 
Constant -1.324** -1.365**  -1.583** -3.413*** 
 (0.550) (0.614)  (0.604) (0.551) 
Year dummy Y Y  Y Y 
Observations /Country 164/25 269/44  104/16 97/19 
Adjusted R2 0.332 0.238  0.329 0.247 
 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent 
variable is the first-difference of the logarithm of under-five mortality rate. Heavily 
commodity-dependent countries have a ratio of net commodity exports to GDP that exceeds 7 
(-7) percent.    
 Table 3 
Child mortality, CTOT growth and volatility/regime interaction effect for heavily commodity-dependent countries, 1970-2010 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 5-year democracy  Modal democracy  Distribution of resources 
 Commodity 
exporters 
Cluster SE 
Commodity 
importers 
Cluster SE 
 Commodity 
exporters 
Cluster SE 
Commodity 
importers 
Cluster SE 
 Commodity 
exporters 
Cluster SE 
Commodity 
importers  
Cluster SE 
CTOT volatility × autocracy 0.906 5.887**  1.601 7.145***    
 (1.835) (2.143)  (2.332) (1.679)    
CTOT volatility × democracy -2.449 6.901  0.882 -2.386    
 (6.224) (6.432)  (3.844) (3.112)    
CTOT volatility × poor distribution        1.247 8.134*** 
of resources       (1.607) (1.885) 
CTOT volatility × fair distribution        2.659 -4.653 
of resources       (10.29) (3.967) 
CTOT growth -1.234 0.902  -0.541 -0.0115  -1.093 2.291* 
 (2.746) (3.398)  (2.488) (3.702)  (1.275) (1.115) 
Democracy dummy -0.351 -1.120  -0.786 1.202  0.586 1.816 
 (0.973) (1.520)  (1.160) (0.702)  (1.809) (2.421) 
GDP per capita growth -20.33*** -13.37**  -14.28** -8.191  -20.54*** -9.093** 
 (4.860) (6.170)  (5.955) (7.314)  (5.011) (4.252) 
Δ(Primary education enrolment ratio)  -13.94** 6.800  -11.02** -3.606  -12.16** 0.139 
 (5.433) (4.776)  (4.882) (4.541)  (4.848) (5.761) 
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Δ(Financial development) -3.600*** -3.860**  -7.387*** -4.810**  -4.902*** -4.843*** 
 (1.182) (1.723)  (2.317) (2.091)  (0.917) (1.404) 
Δ(Population over age 65)  17.21 -18.92  6.014 -32.44  0.570 -20.47 
 (18.67) (18.50)  (17.41) (27.72)  (13.05) (17.08) 
Δ(Population under age 5) 53.20*** -1.162  17.27 3.815  40.74*** 0.673 
 (16.85) (11.81)  (25.99) (15.62)  (12.97) (11.04) 
Constant -1.737** -3.389***  -1.706 -4.184***  -1.732** -4.146*** 
 (0.632) (0.563)  (0.986) (0.542)  (0.601) (0.722) 
Year dummy Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
F-test 0.592 0.482  0.878 0.011  0.891 0.006 
Observations /Country 104/16 97/19  90/15 84/19  16/104 18/94 
Adjusted R2 0.323 0.238  0.304 0.171  0.341 0.320 
 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Heavily commodity-dependent countries have a ratio of net 
commodity exports to GDP that exceeds 7 (-7) percent. F-test is the p-value of a test of equality between the coefficients on the interaction terms 
(i.e., 𝐻0: 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 ) in (3). The dependent variable is the first-difference of the logarithm of under-five mortality rate. “5-year democracy” – 
democracy/autocracy variable computed as the modal value of the corresponding index in each 5-year period. “Modal democracy” – 
democracy/autocracy variable computed as the modal value of the corresponding index over the whole period 1970-2010. “Distribution of 
resources” – the model with institutional quality proxied by the distribution of resources index. 
 Table 4 
Child mortality, growth and volatility of energy CTOT and non-energy CTOT in heavily 
commodity-dependent countries, 1970-2010 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Commodity  
exporters 
Cluster SE 
Commodity  
importers 
Cluster SE 
Non-Energy TOT volatility -2.145 0.0438 
 (4.694) (4.686) 
Energy TOT volatility 1.418 11.01*** 
 (2.602) (2.197) 
Non-Energy TOT growth -1.070 6.618 
 (2.943) (4.967) 
Energy TOT growth -1.550 2.656 
 (2.848) (2.803) 
Democracy dummy -0.783 -1.338* 
 (0.598) (0.723) 
GDP per capita growth -21.09*** -18.61*** 
 (5.052) (6.067) 
Δ(Primary education enrolment ratio) -14.24** 0.448 
 (5.382) (7.215) 
Δ(Financial development) -3.651*** -5.255 
 (1.162) (3.510) 
Δ(Population over age 65) 18.09 -17.44 
 (16.86) (19.64) 
Δ(Population under age 5) 53.48*** 2.846 
 (16.20) (14.05) 
Constant -1.548* -2.991*** 
 (0.802) (0.786) 
Year dummy Y Y 
Observations 104 76 
Adjusted R2 0.318 0.243 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Heavily 
commodity-dependent countries have a ratio of net commodity exports to GDP that exceeds 7 
(-7) percent. The dependent variable is the first-difference of the logarithm of under-five 
mortality rate. 
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Table 5 
Child mortality, CTOT growth and volatility for countries with top quartile CTOT volatility 
1970-2010 
 (1) (2) 
 Rest of sample 
Cluster SE 
Top Quartile 
Cluster SE 
CTOT growth -0.740 3.353 
 (1.590) (2.386) 
CTOT  Volatility  -0.960 5.104* 
 (1.567) (2.700) 
GDP per capita growth -0.812** -1.922** 
 (0.322) (0.818) 
Democracy dummy -24.26*** -14.35* 
 (3.452) (8.201) 
Δ(Financial development) -8.175*** 6.943 
 (2.739) (5.217) 
Δ(Primary education enrolment ratio) -1.205 -1.588 
 (1.139) (1.683) 
Δ(Population over age 65) -14.20 26.44 
 (10.03) (29.57) 
Δ(Population under age 5)  9.172 -49.39*** 
 (7.832) (16.54) 
Constant -1.091** -2.210* 
 (0.517) (1.251) 
Year dummy Y Y 
Observations /Country 331/52 102/17 
Adjusted R2 0.278 0.285 
 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent 
variable is the first-difference of the logarithm of under-five mortality rate. 
 Table 6 
Child mortality, CTOT growth and volatility with different thresholds, 1970-2010 
 
Threshold  3% 6% 8% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Exporters 
Cluster SE 
Importers 
Cluster SE 
Exporters 
Cluster SE 
Importers 
Cluster SE 
Exporters 
Cluster SE 
Importers 
Cluster SE 
CTOT growth  -0.559 0.400 -1.092 0.681 -1.682 0.490 
  (2.160) (1.823) (2.443) (1.900) (2.568) (4.124) 
CTOT volatility  0.971 1.548 0.660 3.589* 1.222 4.205** 
  (1.551) (1.531) (1.693) (2.059) (2.618) (1.807) 
Democracy dummy  -0.574 -0.668 -0.756 -0.627 -0.773 -1.151 
  (0.448) (0.492) (0.528) (0.707) (0.599) (1.175) 
GDP per capita growth  -20.67*** -12.00** -19.68*** -12.21* -22.27*** -9.516 
  (3.463) (5.594) (3.885) (5.948) (5.176) (7.867) 
Δ(Primary education enrolment ratio)  -11.03*** 1.827 -13.98** 4.196 -11.70* 5.219 
  (3.142) (3.350) (5.275) (4.104) (5.489) (7.353) 
Δ(Financial development)  -1.758 -3.486*** -2.745* -4.005** -3.608** -2.938 
  (1.035) (1.209) (1.318) (1.605) (1.416) (1.756) 
Δ(Population over age 65)  6.671 -20.29 6.643 -18.03 14.51 -25.47 
  (14.06) (15.33) (17.83) (16.45) (16.72) (19.38) 
Δ(Population under age 5)  42.67*** -3.131 45.62*** -1.703 53.62*** -14.08 
  (11.27) (11.13) (12.61) (10.55) (15.66) (12.01) 
Constant  -1.682*** -1.960*** -1.667*** -2.806*** -1.850* -3.199*** 
  (0.524) (0.694) (0.570) (0.602) (0.886) (0.695) 
Year dummy  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs./country  143/22 146/27 114/18 103/20 92/14 71/14 
Adjusted R2  0.319 0.200 0.314 0.210 0.300 0.166 
 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the first-difference of the logarithm of 
under-five mortality rate. 
 FIGURES 
Figure 1 
Commodity dependence of low and lower-middle income countries (average net commodity 
export to GDP, 2005-10) 
 
  
Note. For sources of data, see Section 4. 
 
 Figure 2 
Transmission channels of the effects of movements in commodity prices on child mortality. 
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 Figure 3 
CTOT level and growth over time for heavily commodity-dependent exporters and importers 
(net exports to GDP above 7% and below -7% respectively)  
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Figure 4 
Structure of net commodity export of heavily commodity-dependent countries  
(net exports to GDP above 7% and below -7% respectively) 
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Appendix A 
A.1. Panel unit root tests for child mortality  
Table A1 
Panel unit root tests 
 
Series  t-Statistic p-value L 
IPS test  
Child mortality without trend 0.10 0.84 2.01 
Child mortality with trend -1.49 0.68 1.88 
Child mortality growth -5.07 0.00 1.78 
Fisher test  
Child mortality without trend -1.24 0.11 3 
Child mortality with trend -1.30 0.10 3 
Child mortality growth -5.25 0.00 3 
 
Notes: p value represents the probability that the null hypothesis is true. L represents 
the (average) lag length.  
  
A.2 Modified Dickey–Fuller unit root tests for CTOT level and growth  
 
Table A2 
Modified Dickey–Fuller unit root test  
  
 CTOT Level CTOT growth  
Country Test statistic lag 
Test 
statistic lag 
Afghanistan -2.768 1 -4.894*** 
1 
Armenia -2.135 1 
-2.688*** 1 
Bangladesh -1.117 1 
-3.567*** 1 
Benin -2.396 1 
-4.404*** 1 
Bhutan -1.373 1 
-1.835 2 
Bolivia -1.894 1 
-3.589*** 1 
Burkina Faso -2.385 1 
-4.441*** 1 
Burundi -2.662 1 
-4.008*** 1 
Cabo Verde -1.717 1 
-4.3*** 1 
Cameroon -4.372** 1 
-4.822*** 1 
Central African Republic -1.859 1 
-3.862*** 1 
Comoros -2.546 1 
-3.751*** 1 
Congo, Rep. -1.87 1 
-4.157*** 1 
Cote d'Ivoire -3.135 1 
-3.924*** 1 
Djibouti -1.743 1 
-3.833*** 1 
Egypt, Arab Rep. -1.72 1 
-3.804*** 1 
El Salvador -2.593 1 
-4.053*** 1 
Eritrea -1.366 1 
-3.835*** 1 
Ethiopia -2.594 1 
-3.953*** 1 
Gambia, The -1.251 1 
-4.952*** 1 
Georgia -2.387 1 
-3.543*** 1 
Ghana -3.641** 1 
-4.128*** 1 
Guatemala -2.217 1 
-3.971*** 1 
Guinea -2.528 1 
-4.385*** 1 
Guinea-Bissau -4.112*** 1 
-5.032*** 1 
Guyana -2.188 1 
-4.154*** 1 
Honduras -2.28 1 
-3.982*** 1 
India -1.928 1 
-3.646*** 1 
Indonesia -1.791 1 
-2.941*** 1 
Kenya -2.16 1 
-3.344*** 1 
Kyrgyz Republic -2.186 1 
-5.352*** 1 
Lesotho -2.177 1 
-3.815*** 1 
Madagascar -1.936 1 
-4.066*** 1 
Malawi -1.886 1 
-4.848*** 1 
Mali -2.257 1 
-4.78*** 1 
Mauritania -0.732 1 
-3.215*** 1 
Moldova -2.208 1 
-4.41*** 1 
Mongolia -1.891 1 
-1.439 2 
Morocco -1.829 1 
-4.408*** 1 
Mozambique -2.141 1 
-4.602*** 1 
Nepal -1.629 1 
-3.884*** 1 
Nicaragua -2.281 1 
-4.19*** 1 
Niger -2.425 1 
-4.43*** 1 
Nigeria -1.552 1 
-3.79*** 1 
Pakistan -1.851 1 
-3.491*** 1 
Papua New Guinea -2.605 3 
-2.453** 2 
Paraguay -2.053 1 
-3.892*** 1 
Philippines -2.007 1 
-3.689*** 1 
Rwanda -3.29* 2 
-3.571*** 1 
Samoa -1.743 1 
-4.651*** 1 
Sao Tome and Principe -4.392*** 1 
-4.139*** 1 
Senegal -0.624 2 
-2.014*** 2 
Sierra Leone -2.45 1 
-3.873*** 1 
Solomon Islands -3.718** 1 
-4.85*** 1 
Sri Lanka -2.106 1 
-3.043*** 1 
Sudan -1.868 1 
-4.042*** 1 
Swaziland -4.645*** 8 
-4.82*** 1 
Syrian Arab Republic -1.684 1 
-3.267*** 1 
Tajikistan -2.734 1 
-4.486*** 1 
Tanzania -1.969 1 
-4.351*** 1 
Timor-Leste -2.402 1 
-3.932*** 1 
Togo -2.256 1 
-4.607*** 1 
Uganda -2.632 1 
-3.977*** 1 
Ukraine -2.443 1 
-4.83*** 1 
Vanuatu -2.222 1 
-4.527*** 1 
Vietnam -3.094 1 
-5.172*** 1 
Yemen, Rep. -1.769 1 
-3.907*** 1 
Zambia -1.662 1 
-1.256 2 
Zimbabwe -2.123 1 
-4.242*** 1 
 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
A.3. Average pairwise correlation coefficient for CTOT growth 
Table A3 
Average pairwise correlation coefficient 
 
Sample Correlation coefficient 
Annual data: Full sample 0.298 
Annual data: All exporters 0.204 
Annual data: All importers 0.348 
Annual data: Heavy exporters 0.109 
Annual data: Heavy importers 0.331 
5-year obs: Full sample 0.262 
5-year obs: All exporters 0.194 
5-year obs: All importers 0.295 
5-year obs: Heavy exporters 0.109 
5-year obs: Heavy importers 0.264 
 
 
 
  
A.4. List of Countries 
Table A4 
Commodity Exporters (25 countries) Commodity Importers (44 countries) 
Bolivia* Afghanistan*a 
Burundi a Armenia* 
Cameroon* Bangladesh 
Congo, Rep.* Benin 
Cote d'Ivoire* Bhutan* 
Ghana Burkina Faso 
Guinea* Cabo Verde* a 
Guyana* Central African Rep. 
Honduras a Comoros a 
Indonesia Djibouti* 
Mali* Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Mauritania* El Salvador 
Mongolia* a Eritrea* a 
Mozambique Ethiopia a 
Nigeria* Gambia, The* 
Papua New Guinea* Georgia* 
Paraguay* a Guatemala 
Sudan Guinea-Bissau 
Syrian Arab Rep.* India 
Tajikistan* Kenya 
Uganda a Kyrgyz Rep. 
Vietnam Lesotho* 
Yemen, Rep.* Madagascar 
Zambia* Malawi 
Zimbabwe Moldova* 
 Morocco* 
 Nepal* 
 Nicaragua a 
 Niger a 
 Pakistan 
 Philippines 
 Rwanda a 
 Samoa* 
 Sao Tome and Principe* a 
 Senegal* 
 Sierra Leone* a 
 Solomon Islands* 
 Sri Lanka 
 Swaziland a 
 Tanzania 
 Timor-Leste* a 
 Togo 
 Ukraine* 
 Vanuatu 
 
Note. * refers to highly commodity-dependent exporters/importers. a refers to the top 
quartile of countries when they are ranked by the magnitude of CTOT volatility.  
 
  
A.5. Trend tests for CTOT 
To test for a panel unit root, we employ Levin–Lin–Chu (LLC) panel test and the Im–
Pesaran–Shin (IPS) panel test. Based on these unit root test results, we estimate 
CTOT trend as follows:  
If 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 is stationary, we estimate the following TS model: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + η𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.       (A1) 
Otherwise, if 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 is non-stationary, we estimate the following DS model: 
 ∆𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                     (A2)                         
where 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡  is a time trend, η𝑖  is the country-specific effect and 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the error 
term. The error terms are clustered at the country level to account for the possibility 
of correlated disturbances within each country. 𝛽𝑖 represents the trend coefficient in 
both TS and DS models. 
Table A5 gives the results of both LLC and IPS unit root tests. The results 
show that both tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit-root (all series contain a unit 
root) in CTOT level in favour of the alternative that some series are stationary, for 
both exporters and importers. Of course, given the individual unit root tests in Table 
A2, this result does not come as a surprise.  
Estimates of the TS model (A1) are shown in the top section of Table A6 and 
illustrate that commodity importers, but not exporters, present a significant trend. 
However, this trend looks small at approximately -0.010. As robustness check, we 
estimate the DS model (A2) for all sub-groups and the results (see the bottom section 
of Table A6) support the TS model findings of a small trend for importers and no 
trend for exporters.  
  
Table A5 
Panel unit root tests  
Series  t-Statistic p value L 
LLC test 
All commodity exporters -2.370*** 0.009 1.96 
All commodity importers -6.679*** 0.000 2.16 
Heavy commodity exporters -1.542* 0.061 1.94 
Heavy commodity  importers -5.183*** 0.000 2.42 
IPS test 
All commodity exporters -3.598*** 0.000 1.96 
All commodity importers -6.347*** 0.000 2.16 
Heavy commodity exporters -2.659*** 0.004 1.94 
Heavy commodity  importers -4.824*** 0.000 2.42 
 
Notes. t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. L is the lag 
average used for the ADF regressions performed in computing the test statistic 
(chosen by AIC). The method proposed in Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) has been used 
to estimate the long-run variance of each panel’s series with maxlags = 3.21𝑇1/3. 
Therefore since T=41, the maxlags is 11. For the benchmark samples, commodity 
exporters (importers) are the countries with positive (negative) net commodity exports 
to GDP. The sub-samples include only highly commodity-dependent exporters 
(importers) where net exports to GDP exceed 7 (-7) percent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A6 
Trend tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All 
commodity 
exporters 
All 
commodity 
importers 
Heavily-
dependent 
commodity 
exporters 
Heavily-
dependent 
commodity 
importers 
Trend -0.005 -0.013*** -0.002 -0.010** 
 (-1.52) (-5.79) (-0.38) (-2.70) 
Constant 4.852*** 5.200*** 4.720*** 5.098*** 
 (74.61) (113.18) (52.92) (68.38) 
Obs./countries 1025/25 1804/44 656/16 779/19 
Constant -0.006 -0.015*** -0.003 -0.013*** 
 (-1.36) (-4.65) (-0.46) (-3.25) 
Obs./countries 1000/25 1760/44 640/16 760/19 
 
Notes.  t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  The sub-samples 
include only heavily commodity-dependent exporters (importers) where net exports to 
GDP exceed 7 (-7) percent 
 
